Inspired by the recent advances in coverage-guided analysis of neural networks (NNs), we propose a novel anomaly detection approach. We show that the hidden activation values in NNs contain information to distinguish between normal and anomalous samples. Common approaches for anomaly detection base the amount of novelty of each data point solely on one single decision variable. We refine this approach by incorporating the entire context of the model. With our data-driven method, we achieve strong anomaly detection results on common baseline data sets, e.g., MNIST and CSE-CIC-IDS2018, purely based on the automatic analysis of the data. Our anomaly detection method allows to easily inspect data across different domains for anomalies without expert knowledge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Anomaly detection is the task of identifying data points that differ in their behavior compared to the majority of samples. Reliable anomaly detection is of great interest in many real-life scenarios, especially in the context of securitysensitive systems. Here, anomalies can indicate attacks on the infrastructure, fraudulent behavior, or general points of interest.
In recent years, the number of anomaly detection systems using deep learning (DL) concepts has steadily grown due to their capability of automatically handling even highly complex data. A popular idea is to measure the reconstruction error of data points, i.e., how much an estimated output resembles the given input. For this purpose, autoencoders (AEs), trained on normal data only, are commonly used. This special type of neural networks (NNs) generates an output that is close to the given input under the constraint of small hidden dimensions. Intuitively, the AEs will miss important features that distinguish anomalous samples such their reconstruction error is high. Based on this, a domain expert sets a threshold on the reconstruction error to detect anomalies. This method only works under the assumption that the overall error is large enough to be detected. Moreover, the analysis is solely based on a single quantity derived from the output. We design a method that uses all information dimensions at hand, thus incorporating the entire system context.
During the conceptual phase, we were inspired by coverageguided neural network testing techniques. In this new and promising research direction, software testing concepts are transferred to DL models. The goal is to identify faulty regions in NNs responsible for unusual behavior or errors during runtime. Pei et al. [14] first introduced the idea of neuron coverage to guide a testing process. Since then, further improvements and modifications have been proposed, e.g., by Ma et al. [10] and Sun et al. [22] . In 2019, Sperl et al. [21] used this concept to detect adversarial examples fed to NNs. The authors analyze the activation values while processing benign and adversarial inputs -a second network classifies if the recorded patterns resemble normal behavior or an attack.
These findings show that the neuron coverage carries security-sensitive information. In this paper, we profit from this insight and further generalize the concept of Sperl et al. [21] : NNs behave in a special and distinguishable manner, when confronted with anomalous data. This behavior can be detected by analyzing the activation values during run-time. Hence, if we observe the neuron activations of NNs while processing normal and anomalous inputs, we can train a binary classifier to distinguish the nature of the analyzed data points.
Applying this concept, we empirically show that anomalous samples cause different hidden activations than normal ones. We analyze the hidden layers of a so-called target network by an auxiliary network, called the alarm network. Our evaluation shows strong results for common data sets and we report a higher detection rate than the state-of-the-art threshold-based technique. In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We propose a general and automated data-driven anomaly detection method. • We implement our approach and evaluate it using three common data sets. • We compare our method to the state-of-the art technique and detect anomalies with higher confidence. • We detect new types of anomalies not known during training and significantly improve semi-supervised anomaly detection.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

A. Nomenclature
Neural networks approximate an input-output mapping f :
of multiple layers f i . Generally, we denote the output, or activation, of the i th layer as
Here σ(·) is a non-linear activation function, W i,j and b i the mapping parameters learned in layer i with respect to layer j. The input is equal to x = h 0 . Thus, the activations simply become a function h i (x; θ) dependent on the input and the network parameters up to the respective layer.
The weights θ i are determined by an optimization algorithm minimizing the expected loss between the desired and estimated output, L(y,ŷ). Our entire data set D = {(x k , y k )}, x k ∈ X , y k ∈ Y is split in three parts: training, validation, and test. The network weights are adapted on the training set while evaluating the performance on the validation set. We consider categorical data, y ∈ {1, 2, . . . |Y|}, where Y denotes the set of available labels. Among other things, we prove the transferability of our anomaly detection method, i.e., the performance of the model evaluated on more labels than it was trained on, Y train ⊂ Y test .
B. Related Work
Anomaly detection is a topic of active research with a diversity of use cases and applied techniques. For instance, in power grids [20] or industrial control systems [8] , automated mechanisms can improve the security of the overall system. A good overview on anomaly detection in general and deep learning based systems particularly is given in the surveys [3] and [2] , respectively
In DL-based anomaly detection systems, a popular choice are architectures incorporating an AE, often used as feature extractor. Some publications using this concept are [23] , [1] , [15] , and [25] . Similarly, other feature extraction networks like recurrent NNs (RNNs) have been evaluated as well, e.g., in [13] and [18] .
To detect anomalies, AEs may also be used in their purest form: to restore the input under the constraint of small hidden layers. Several publications study how well the reconstruction error of samples can discriminate between normal and anomalous data points [23] , [17] , [24] , [12] . Current AE-based anomaly detection schemes use this reconstruction error and detect anomalous samples by manually optimizing a threshold [11] . Ringberg et al. [16] identified problems of past anomaly detection systems, that are still true for many recently proposed methods: the anomaly detection rate is highly dependent on the chosen hyperparameters and thresholds. Furthermore, new types of anomalies are often not detectable by such approaches.
To overcome this problem, we present our new concept to detect anomalies making the same assumption, but investigating another approach to spot the reconstruction difference. Instead of calculating the reconstruction error of the AE, we empirically show that the hidden activations differ for normal and anomalous samples. Using our method, we are able to detect known and even new, yet unseen types of anomalies in different scenarios with high confidence. With our framework, we excel classical threshold-based frameworks and significantly improve NN-driven semi-supervised anomaly detection systems.
III. METHODOLOGY
Based on the activations of a neural network f , we present the following hypothesis building the of our paper:
Evaluating the activations h i of a neural network trained on the data set D train , we observe special patterns that allow to distinguish between classes the network has been trained on, and yet unknown classes
Target Network
x alarm Normal / Anomalous Alarm Network Fig. 1 : Our anomaly detection method consists of two parts: 1) a target network unrelated to anomaly detection (e.g., an autoencoder), and 2) the alarm network judging if the input x is a normal sample. Both parts are connected to one overall network. The connection is between the target network's hidden activations, and the alarm network's input.
We argue that this setting is analog to anomaly detection. An anomaly is defined as a sample different to normal data in some unspecified behavior. When D train describes the normal data, then any point of a yet unknown class y i / ∈ Y train defines an anomaly, i.e., a sample that does not belong to a normal class.
A. Architecture
Our goal is to map the input to a binary output; either the sample is normal (label 0) or anomalous (label 1). We achieve this with our new anomaly detection system consisting two parts, closely related to the adversarial example detection method of Sperl et al. [21] . 1) A target network. The target performs a task unrelated to anomaly detection. In accordance to our assumption, the classes the target was trained on are considered normal. Several architectures of the target are possible -we evaluate fully-connected as well as convolutional autoencoders and classifiers. 2) The alarm network.
The alarm network evaluates if the given sample is normal or anomalous by observing the hidden activations of the target network as response to the input. Both parts are combined to one connected architecture. We consider the activations of the target network caused by the input, h target,i (x; θ target ). Our assumption is that these activations show particular patterns for samples the target network was trained on (i.e., normal samples), and for other samples (i.e., anomalous samples). The alarm network then finds anomalyrelated patterns in the target network's activations. A high level overview is given in Figure 1 . 
B. Training Phase 1) Target Network:
The target network performs a task unrelated to anomaly detection on the input x. We evaluate autoencoders, f target : x →x, and classifiers, f target : x → {1, . . . , |Y|}. According to our fundamental assumption, all samples used in the training are considered normal. We denote these samples as D train, norm. .
2) Alarm Network: The alarm network maps the input to a binary output. However, it does not operate on the input directly, but observes the target network's activations caused by the input:
Hence, the output is implicitly dependent on the input and the network weights of the target and alarm model, y(x; θ target , θ alarm ). The alarm model is trained on the normal as well as the anomalous samples, D train, anom. . In our evaluation, we show that our anomaly detection method even works when |D train, anom. | is small, i.e., in a semi-supervised setting in accordance with constraint 1 (see Section IV-B). Furthermore, we motivate that the target's activations carry general information to detect yet unknown anomalies.
C. Prediction Phase
During the prediction phase, the target and the alarm network act as one combined system, mapping the input to a confidence interval:
The input is transformed by the very same pipeline: x gives rise to particular activations in the target, h target,i (x; θ target ). Based on the target's activation, the alarm network decides whether the input is more likely to be normal or anomalous. The final binary decision is based on a threshold, allowing to focus on precision or recall. Figure 2 gives a high-level overview about the training and prediction phase.
D. Additional Modifications
Due to the high class imbalance in anomaly detection settings, we added two modifications to the training process: a) Automatic class weights: The loss for anomalous samples is weighted higher than for normal samples. Without this modification, the impact of the anomalous samples in the training process would be negligible. We balance between both training classes by setting the anomaly weight w to:
b) Shifted output regularizer: An L1-regularizer is added to the alarm network's output. Without this modification, it would generally be more favorable to predict the label "0" as it covers more samples. However, in anomaly detection, every sample not belonging to the normal class should be predicted as anomalous. Thus, we add an additional loss term L L1 that resembles a shifted L1-regularizer with scaling factor λ:
IV. EXPERIMENTS A. Considered Data Sets
To evaluate the performance of our anomaly detection system, we require data sets, which fulfill the following three requirements building the foundation of our experiments: 1) Public availability to allow performance comparison.
2) Common data set for the proof of concept.
3) Real world data to evaluate complex scenarios. We limit the preprocessing to minmax-scaling numerical and 1-Hot-encoding categorical data. With this, we underline the independence of costly, manually chosen feature selection. We use the following three publicly available data sets: 1) MNIST [9] : common image data set for machine learning problems, comprising ten handwritten digits. Each image consists of 28 × 28 gray-scale pixels. 2) EMNIST [7] : extension of MNIST with handwritten letters following the same format. 3) CSE-CIC-IDS2018 [19] : intrusion detection data set containing network data along with anomaly labels. We omit the DDoS data due to the high resource demands.
B. Anomaly Detection Constraints
Special constraints apply in the setting of anomaly detection that may oppose the use of deep learning frameworks. In our experiments, we show that the developed theory performs well even under these constraints.
1) Scarcity of anomaly samples.
Generally, many samples are required for strong performance using deep learning frameworks. However, there is a natural imbalance in anomaly detection scenarios: most data samples are normal, only a few examples of anomalies were found manually. We show that our anomaly detection algorithm even performs well in a semi-supervised setting where only a few anomaly labels are known. 2) Variable extend of abnormality.
Anomalous samples are not bound by a common behavior or magnitude of anomaly. By definition, the only difference is that anomalies do not resemble normal samples. We show the transferability of our algorithm, i.e., known anomalies during training also reveal yet unknown anomalies during testing.
3) Driven by data, not expert knowledge.
A suitable anomaly detection algorithm should be applicable to multiple settings, even when no expert knowledge is available. Performance that is only achievable using domain knowledge, may result in inferior results in other settings. Prior knowledge undermines the idea of anomaly detection: anomalies are not defined by their particular behavior, but by being different in comparison to normal samples. We show that our algorithm is generalizable to other settings, i.e., uses the data itself to discriminate between normal and anomalous behavior.
C. Experiment 1: Detection of Known Anomalies
In this experiment, we consider constraint 1. We evaluate the fundamental assumption of our method, i.e.: the activation values of the target network contain information to distinguish between normal and anomalous samples. It is important to remember that only the alarm network, not the target, is trained on the anomaly detection task. We show, the target's activations are useful for the anomaly detection task nonetheless.
Here, we identify known anomalies. This setting resembles an important classification task: common anti-virus or IPS systems use attack signatures to judge if the observed behavior is indeed normal. However, we consider an anomaly detection setting bound by the the scarcity of anomaly labels. Our anomaly detection method learns to generalize the activation patterns of a few anomalous samples to identify future occurrences. Table I gives an overview about the data sets and their setting used for this experiment. By applying our anomaly detection method to multiple data sets, we motivate its generality, i.e., constraint 3. In this experiment, we consider constraints 1 and 2. We evaluate the transferability of our fundamental assumption, i.e.: the activation values of the target network are inherently different for normal an anomalous samples. It is important to remember that the target has only been conditioned on samples deemed as normal.
Similar to experiment 1, we evaluate the detection performance bound by the scarcity of anomaly labels. Furthermore, we evaluate the transferability of our method: the test data set contains more anomaly classes than the alarm network was trained on. Our anomaly detection method finds general activation patterns that identify yet unknown anomalies. Table II gives an overview about the data sets and their setting used for this experiment. By applying our anomaly detection method to multiple data sets, we motivate its generality, i.e., constraint 3. 
E. Experiment 3: Generality of the Method
In this experiment, we consider constraints 1, 2, and 3. We evaluate the generality of our fundamental assumption, i.e.: the activation values of any type of target network contain information to distinguish between normal and anomalous samples. It is important to remember that we did not impose any assumption about the task of the target network. We show, even the activation values of common classifiers contain information useful for anomaly detection tasks.
We use a publicly available classifier as target, extract the activation values, and show these can be used to detect known as well as unknown anomalies. Similar to experiment 2, we add more anomalies to the test data set than there were used to train the alarm network. Hence, we motivate that our anomaly detection mechanism can be applied to already existing target networks and environments of any type. Table III gives an overview about the data sets and their setting used for this experiment. By applying our anomaly detection method to multiple data sets, we motivate its generality, i.e., constraint 3. 
F. Experiment Overview
For each experiment, we perform four runs with a varying size of anomaly samples. While training the target, all normal samples are used, but the number of anomalies is reduced to |D train, anom. | ∈ {25, 50, 100, 200}. By doing so, we simulate constraint 1 even in close to unsupervised settings. As consequence, we use considerably less known anomalies than available in the data sets.
An overview about the used architectures is found in Table IV. For the the symmetric AE-based target models, we chose the first layer to be slightly larger than the dimension of the input vectors, whereas the hidden representation should be smaller. For the sake of simplicity, we use a common alarm model architecture throughout this paper. Note that for both MNIST-related experiments, we considered two publicly available target model architectures from Keras [6] , i.e., a convolution AE [5] extended by a dropout layer for experiment 1 and a CNN [4] for experiment 3. This underlines the generality of our method. 
V. RESULTS AND EVALUATION
In the following, we present and evaluate the results measured during our three experiments. We put a strong focus on a sound evaluation. The detection parameters were solely determined based on the validation data, and only on experiments where all anomalies are known. As consequence, the results for the transfer experiments are based on the parameters determined by the experiments of known anomalies. This is the very same setting as in real-life scenarios: based on the performance of the model on known anomalies, yet unknown anomalies should be discovered.
A. Validation Results and Choice of Parameters
We did a non-exhaustive grid search on our two training hyperparameters, the maximum class weight and the magnitude of the shifted L1-regularizer. Based on the validation data, we found w max = 100 and λ = 0.01 to be suitable parameters. To determine the detection threshold, we automatically analyzed the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve shown in Figure 3 . We impose a maximum false positive rate (FPR) of 1% for IDS and 5% for MNIST, and use the threshold resulting in the highest true positive rate under this constraint. It is of importance to have a low FPR in IDS scenarios with high traffic: each false alarm causes manual work. We report that our anomaly detection system clearly outperforms 
B. Test Results
In Table V , we summarize the results of our three experiments using the test data sets. For the sake of readability, we show and discuss the results for 200 known anomalous samples during training. By doing so, we simulate a semisupervised real-world scenario. Additionally, we show the results of the state-of-the-art baseline implementation to which we compare our method.
For experiment 1, the test set only comprises anomalies that are known during training. We report a strong detection performance with F1-scores above 0.90. In this scenario, we clearly outperform the baseline detection system which achieves a maximum F1-score of 0.56. We put a slight emphasis on the precision, but could well tune the performance by adjusting the detection threshold. These results show the excellent performance if retrieving known anomalies. This scenario resembles a black-list IDS where already a few examples lead to strong a detection performance.
With our results from experiment 2, we show that we are able to confidently detect yet unknown types of anomalies. Again, we clearly outperform the baseline implementation. Also here, the recall may simply be improved by allowing a higher FPR. This underlines our main intuition: indeed, the activation patterns of the target network can be used to detect anomalous inputs. Our anomaly detection method is capable of transferring the patterns learned on known anomalies to unseen anomaly patterns.
Finally, for experiment 3, we report F1-scores well above 0.90 for known anomalies. Here, we used a pretrained target model showing the generality of our approach. Note, that for this experiment, no baseline comparison is possible since we used a CNN-based classifier as target. We conclude that our anomaly detection method does not only detect known and even unknown anomalies with high confidence, but also does not rely on a specific target network architecture. Thus, our anomaly detection system integrates well in pre-existing environments.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we show strong results in both precision and recall for all three analyzed data sets, following a sound evaluation. Our final parameters are solely based on the performance of the validation set, and only on data that may be known in advance. We motivate the transferability and generalization of our concept by evaluating different target networks, e.g., AEs, classifiers, and CNNs. So far, we tuned a few detection-related hyperparameters in a non-exhaustive grid search. Neural networks come with a variety of additional parameters, e.g., the architecture and the optimizer, that were set by intuition. We are confident that additional parameter tuning will further improve the results.
We emphasize the real-life applicability of our concept. In our experiments, we restricted the number of anomalous training samples. Hence, we simulate a realistic setting in which the process of collecting anomalous samples is often time consuming and sometimes not possible. Even in this scenario, we are able to confidently detect anomalous samples, considerably improving NN-based detection systems. We hope to give a good balance between applicability and performance. Possibly, better results could have been obtained by using all anomaly samples available -at the cost that real-life scenarios would result in a degraded performance.
VII. CONCLUSION
We introduce a novel approach for anomaly detection based on the hidden activation patterns of NNs, thus taking all context information at hand into consideration. Our architecture comprises two parts: a target network unrelated to the anomaly detection task, and an alarm network analyzing the target's activations. Our framework fulfills common assumptions and constraints typically found in anomaly detection tasks. We assume that anomalous training samples are scarce, and new types of anomalies exist during deployment. With our evaluation, we provide strong evidence that our method works on different target network architectures and generalizes to yet unseen anomalous samples. We provide a valuable extension to NN-based anomaly detection, taking significant steps towards a semi-supervised, purely data-driven anomaly detection solution for a variety of use cases.
